

Causality-based LTL Model Checking without Automata

joint work with Bernd Finkbeiner

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October 23, 2014



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Reactive
Systems

Overview: evolution of the causality-based method

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Safety/Reachability

$$\pm \forall \pi. \square \Phi / \exists \pi. \diamond \Phi$$

✓ Infinite-state

✓ Multi-threading

$$T_1 \parallel \dots \parallel T_n \models$$

$$\square \neg (at_{l_3} \wedge at_{m_3})$$

[CONCUR 2013]

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
Safety: the class of multi-threaded programs with binary locks and arbitrary control flow is analyzable in PTIME.

Termination: the first termination prover that scales to a large number of non-trivial concurrent threads.

Threads	Terminator		T2		AProVE		Arctor ¹	
	Time(s)	Mem.(MB)	Time(s)	Mem.(MB)	Time(s)	Mem.(MB)	Time(s)	Mem.(MB)
1	3.37	26	2.42	38	3.17	237	0.002	2.3
2	1397	1394	3.25	44	6.79	523	0.002	2.6
3	×	MO	U(29.2)	253	U(26.6)	1439	0.002	2.6
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80	×	MO	Z3-TO	×	×	MO	67.7	145
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¹ **Arctor** : Abstraction Refinement of Concurrent Temporal Orderings (react.uni-saarland.de/tools/arctor/)

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Automata-based LTL Model Checking

The standard way to model check a program P against an LTL property φ :

- 1 translate $\neg\varphi$ into a Büchi automaton A
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Example: individual accessibility for semaphores

Fair scheduling:

$$\Box\Diamond(at_2 \wedge r_{free}) \implies \Box\Diamond at_3$$

Termination of critical sections:

$$\Box(at_3 \implies \Diamond at_1)$$

Individual accessibility:

$$\Box(at_2 \implies \Diamond at_3)$$

$$\varphi \equiv \bigwedge_{i \in 1..n} (\text{Scheduling}_i \wedge \text{Termination}_i) \implies \text{Accessibility}_1$$

Translation of $\neg\varphi$

into a Büchi automaton, **ltl3ba**:

Threads	Time (sec)	Automaton (MB)
2	0.005	0.002
3	0.09	0.38
4	9.6	8.6
5	1295	185
6	TO	X

Our approach

Causality

A relationship between two events, when the occurrence of first event is recognized as a necessary prerequisite for the occurrence of the second


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- **Proof objects: concurrent traces**

compactly represent sets of program runs, by specifying events that should *necessarily* occur in the run, and the partial order between them




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- Proof rules based on causality**
 goal-directed, language-preserving trace transformations




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
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
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- Proof construction: tableau search based on causal loops**
causal loops \equiv infinitely-looping trace transformations
 - root trace captures all possible counterexamples
 - tableau branches according to applications of proof rules
 - termination when all leaves are contradictory, or covered by causal loops



LTL Model Checking Algorithm




Conclusion




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
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check my PhD thesis
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Want to learn more? See the poster, and talk to me!